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Abstract
A potential pathway exists for a Northeast Asian settlement where the Koreas, the United States, China, and Japan can each live within the status quo. Sustaining a settlement will require reining 
in foreign policy hawks reluctant to allow the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea (DPRK) to retain a nuclear arsenal. The United States will 
also need to engage allies fearful of conflict with North Korea but also 
disinclined to let a neighboring state enjoy a local nuclear monopoly. The 
United States should continue outreach to North Korea with the objective 
of establishing a process that links sanctions relief and security guarantees 
to a plan for eventual denuclearization. The future China- DPRK relation-
ship must be considered and isolated from the US- China relationship—
notably, economic tensions and disputes in the South and East China Seas. 
It should facilitate Chinese leverage over North Korea and encourage 
China to reinforce its economic and security ties with North Korea to 
influence and restrain Pyongyang’s decision making. The Trump adminis-
tration must earn the support of stakeholders across the policy- making 
and procedural spectrum and facilitate a domestic political consensus in 
favor of the emerging settlement. Securing a settlement in Northeast Asia 
may be a productive way of reducing one of the most troublesome spots in 
US foreign relations.1
*****
The last two years have witnessed among the most substantial shifts in 
Northeast Asian regional politics in the last half century. With the North 
Korean nuclear and missile programs advancing at a rapid clip, 2017 and 
early 2018 saw credible signs that the United States might go to war to 
limit further North Korean advances.2 However, the subsequent an-
nouncement that President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim 
Jong- un would meet in June 2018 to ostensibly negotiate over the North 
Korean nuclear program sharply changed the dynamic. The Singapore 
24  STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY  SUMMER 2019
Joshua Shifrinson
Summit resulted in an ostensible pledge to “work toward complete de-
nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” 3 Since then, policy makers from 
the United States and North Korea, along with other vested regional 
actors, have engaged in sustained formal and informal diplomatic bar-
gaining aimed at adding substance to Singapore’s rhetorical framework.
Few analysts believe the process catalyzed by Singapore will result in a 
substantial resolution of outstanding nuclear issues between the area’s key 
actors. If anything, analysts warn that the United States’ failure to craft a 
realistic pathway to North Korea’s “complete, verifiable, [and] irreversible 
denuclearization” leaves Northeast Asia primed for instability—a situation 
rendered all the more likely given stalled progress following the February 
2019 Hanoi Summit between Trump and Kim.4 In this view, the fact that 
North Korea (like other states) is unlikely to surrender its nuclear arsenal 
raises the possibility that Trump and his team may become disenchanted 
with North Korea, thereby increasing the chance that the United States 
may lash out against what will then be a North Korea with a more robust 
nuclear arsenal.5 Along the way—so the argument goes—the United 
States risks seeing its South Korean and Japanese allies lose trust and 
interest in US security guarantees, undercutting the capacity of the United 
States to respond should relations with North Korea deteriorate.6 The 
fiction of North Korean denuclearization, in other words, creates a frame-
work in which many things may go wrong without actually addressing the 
North Korean nuclear program. These concerns are valid and cannot be 
dismissed out of hand.
Still, focusing largely on whether the ongoing negotiations will facili-
tate denuclearization—or even a slowdown of North Korea’s nuclear 
program—may overlook the potential that a series of implicit deals and 
understandings may be emerging that can help stabilize Northeast Asian 
politics.7 To be sure, such a “settlement” remains only a potentiality at this 
point. Nevertheless, history is replete with cases of powerful states finding 
ways to cooperate and of setting aside past tensions even in the face of 
notional diplomatic failures and outstanding disputes.8 Equally important, 
states regularly bargain and seek an array of political understandings with 
one another when faced with a significant shift in the distribution of 
power such as that represented by the DPRK’s nuclear acquisition. Some 
sort of new equilibrium is the natural result of North Korea’s recent 
nuclear advances. Given the diplomatic processes, understandings, and 
shifts that unfolded over the course of 2017–19, reasonable prospects exist 
for a broader diplomatic and strategic stabilization in Northeast Asia.
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To explain this argument and the potential steps needed to reach a 
settlement, this article proceeds in five parts. First, it covers the logic of 
settlements in international relations. Then, the piece provides background 
on the problems posed by North Korea vis- à- vis Northeast Asia’s security 
in the post–Cold War era. Next, it outlines the diplomatic developments 
that have made a settlement possible followed by the rationale and con-
tent of this prospective settlement. Finally, it proposes steps that may be 
necessary to bring a settlement to fruition and events that could derail 
the process.
Settlements in World Politics
Because states operate in an anarchic international system with varying 
degrees of power, the threat of war is omnipresent in international 
politics.9 To obtain security for themselves under such conditions, states 
have two basic options. First, they can arm and prepare for conflict, building 
up the military, economic, and political tools needed to deter or defeat 
prospective opponents.10 Second, they can attempt to resolve their differ-
ences with other countries, relying on diplomatic deals of varying degrees 
of formality to mitigate points of friction.11 Conflict cannot be foreclosed 
entirely—in anarchy, states can and sometimes do go back on prior deals.12 
However, addressing outstanding disputes and points of strategic conten-
tion can dampen the likelihood that war is a near- term possibility, creating 
room for states to continue strengthening ties while focusing their energies 
on other domestic or international issues.13
Settlements belong to the latter category. As Henry Kissinger once ar-
gued, settlements refer to a “process by which a nation reconciles its vision 
of itself with the vision of it by other powers”—that is, a dynamic by 
which two or more states reach an understanding about the general 
parameters of what they will and will not do with the capabilities at their 
disposal.14 In effect, any settlement crafts a framework within which states 
agree to cooperate or compete with one another on core issues within 
certain boundaries, without seeking wholesale and unilateral changes to 
the status quo.15 No one state party to a settlement is likely to be entirely 
happy with its terms and conditions; by definition, a settlement requires 
participants to restrain their ambitions and accept limits on the pursuit of 
their interests. Still, so long as there is no “grievance of such magnitude 
that redress will be sought in overturning” an arrangement—if parties es-
sentially have a stake in it and value the benefits of constrained cooperation 
over the potential of attaining one’s maximal ambitions by a resumption of 
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unconstrained competition—settlements facilitate and incentivize peaceful 
competition.16
Settlements can be pursued through two basic channels. The first and 
most obvious is through direct negotiation. Here, diplomats and policy 
makers meet to directly shape the territorial, institutional, economic, and 
security arrangements believed necessary to reconcile rival states to one 
another’s interests and power. History is replete with efforts along these 
lines. Thus, the Congress of Vienna helped craft a stable European settle-
ment in the aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, 
allowing the European great powers to manage their inevitable conflicts 
of interest over the next four decades.17 Similarly, and although its internal 
contradictions eventually contributed to the breakdown of European di-
plomacy and the re- emergence of major war, the Paris Peace Conference 
of 1919 represented an effort by the victors of the First World War to 
directly construct a new framework for managing great power relations in 
Europe and beyond.18 The Yalta and Potsdam Summits of 1945 entailed a 
parallel effort to shape the post-1945 world, one that (like its Paris prede-
cessor) failed—contributing to the Cold War—as the United States and 
Soviet Union declined to live within the negotiated frameworks.19 Con-
versely, the United States’ reluctance to tie its hands regarding the declining 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that Soviet efforts to 
organize a similarly negotiated settlement for post–Cold War Europe came 
to nothing.20
Second, and less appreciated, are settlements arranged through tacit 
understandings and iterated negotiations that gradually contribute to a 
broader framework. To appreciate this approach, it is instructive to con-
sider the development of the US- Soviet settlement in Cold War Europe. 
The first 15 years of the Cold War saw the two states nearly come to blows 
over the division of Europe and whether Germany would be unified or 
divided, nuclear armed, and/or aligned with the United States or USSR or 
neutral.21 However, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and with 
the United States and USSR able to deter each other with robust nuclear 
arsenals, the two superpowers changed course to embrace Europe’s status 
quo.22 The arms race would continue, but the superpowers used a series of 
diplomatic discussions to remove many of the flashpoints that could pre-
cipitate conflict. Thus, Germany would remain divided and nonnuclear, 
the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization would remain 
intact, and the United States and USSR would accept responsibility for 
managing security affairs within their respective spheres of influence. Neither 
side necessarily desired these agreements or anticipated the deals that trans-
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pired. Nevertheless, the emergence of what Marc Trachtenberg calls the 
“European settlement” reduced Cold War tensions to a manageable level, 
allowing diplomatic wrangling to replace brinksmanship as the coin of 
European politics.23
Regardless of the path taken, the key to identifying a settlement is thus 
asking whether parties appear to recognize limits to the scope of their 
competition and seem willing to bargain with one another on the core 
issues at stake. Put differently, the issue is not whether states are sacrificing 
some of their interests—all settlements involve some mutual sacrifice—
but whether (1) there is a reason for them to do so and (2) senior leaders 
accept the need for trade- offs without pressing their respective advantages 
to the hilt. Doing so, in turn, means looking beyond what policy makers 
say on a day- to- day basis and instead focusing on overarching trends and 
processes that collectively indicate how states understand and are pursu-
ing their interests.24
North Korea’s Challenge to Northeast Asia Security
What, then, are the prospects for a settlement in Northeast Asia? Evalu-
ating the potential for a new equilibrium first requires understanding the 
multifaceted nature of North Korea’s challenge to post–Cold War Northeast 
Asia. First, and most obviously, North Korea constitutes a direct military 
threat to several of its neighbors. South Korea has long lived with the 
possibility of a North Korean attack.25 Similarly, Japan has been subjected 
to North Korean assaults on Japanese citizens while its cities are within 
range of North Korean missiles.26 As for the United States, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile breakout over the last decade raises the prospect of a 
North Korean strike on the US homeland itself.27 And although the North 
Korean military threat could theoretically be eliminated by an invasion or 
managed by efforts to deter North Korea, the United States has been re-
luctant to embrace either option.28 After all, invasion presents real military 
risks to the United States and its allies,29 while living with nuclear- armed 
adversaries has long been unpalatable to American policy makers.30
Second, North Korea presents significant entrapment risks.31 A conflict 
between North and South Korea, for example, could lead to the United 
States’ involvement under the provisions of the US–South Korean alli-
ance. A contest between the United States and DPRK might drag in 
China, fearful of losing a proximate ally and/or seeing American forces 
poised near Chinese territory.32 Even if regional states do not value the 
stakes of a conflict involving North Korea per se, the course or repercus-
sions of such a contest might still lead to their ensnarement.
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A final challenge involves the prospect of North Korea’s removal as a 
sovereign actor. In brief, North Korea’s survival is not guaranteed. Not only 
could the state be eliminated through invasion or regime change, but the 
country’s pervasive economic and demographic problems make a domestic 
implosion a risk as well. Such possibilities carry a host of subsidiary prob-
lems. On one level, North Korea’s disappearance would present China, the 
United States, and others with thorny questions surrounding the future of 
the Korean peninsula and whether a unified Korea would ally with the 
United States or China or go neutral.33 To this end, China has tried to avoid 
threatening North Korea’s domestic stability, just as the United States and 
its allies have expressed discomfort with what might happen if North Korea 
implodes.34 At the same time, wrangling over Korea’s future status and/or 
trying to forestall North Korea’s disappearance could lead to an escalatory 
crisis, up to and including a US- China confrontation.35 In this sense, North 
Korea’s neighbors have needed to live with a fraught situation in which 
the only thing more problematic than the DPRK’s threatening behavior 
and entrapment risk is its destruction.
The net result has been a fragile status quo in Northeast Asia. Ulti-
mately, steps taken by China, the United States, or other actors to affect 
North Korea’s strategic position could easily jeopardize others’ interests, 
just as North Korean actions could themselves imperil friend and foe 
alike.36 Akin to the first part of the Cold War, the result has been a situa-
tion prone to crisis and instability.
Diplomatic Developments: A Nascent Framework?
That said, it is possible to envision a prospective settlement emerging in 
Northeast Asia. To do so, however, requires looking beyond the specific 
twists and turns of the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program 
per se. Indeed, with North Korea’s vague commitment to denucleariza-
tion, the limited progress in influencing North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
programs since Singapore, and the early breakup of the subsequent Hanoi 
Summit, most analysts note that the Trump administration has failed to 
attain its stated aim of unraveling North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.37 
Instead, the potential for a settlement comes from what strategic under-
standings and implicit meanings may lurk behind and result from the 
diplomatic discussions witnessed over the last few years. Building on the 
recognition that settlements can emerge in evolutionary fashion, five 
trends suggest that a Northeast Asia settlement is not an impossibility.
First, the United States has largely taken regime change off the table 
and committed to the DPRK’s continuation.38 North Korea’s nuclear arsenal 
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and growing capacity to target the mainland United States alone make 
any US- led attack on North Korea a much less plausible option than in 
the recent past.39 Just as important, events during and after the Singapore 
Summit reinforced and de facto committed the United States to sustain-
ing North Korea’s existence. For one thing, having suggested in 2017 and 
early 2018 that a military campaign against North Korea was a possibility, 
the Trump administration has now moved in the opposite direction.40 
Hints of a change were already visible in May 2018 when Trump pledged 
that any North Korean deal “would be with Kim Jong Un, something 
where he’d be there, he’d be in his country, he’d be running his country.”41 
Since Singapore, however, these steps have kicked into high gear. Not only 
did the United States sign an agreement pledging security guarantees for 
North Korea in exchange for the DPRK beginning the denuclearization 
process, but Trump put deeds behind these words by suspending joint 
US- South Korean war games that the North claimed were provocative.42 
Nor were these actions a temporary departure. In fact, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo returned to the theme in late June 2018, promising that the 
United States would “provide security assurances for the North Korean 
people” so long as North Korea remains committed to denuclearization.43 
Similarly, the run- up to the Hanoi Summit saw the US special representa-
tive for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, bluntly declare, “We are not going 
to invade North Korea. We are not seeking to topple the North Korean 
regime” in an effort to reassure the Kim government.44 Neither did the 
breakup at Hanoi upset the process, as Trump moved in March 2019 to 
again suspend US–South Korean war games regularly decried as provoca-
tive by the North.45
Second, North Korea has given the United States latitude to back out 
of the ongoing standoff over the DPRK nuclear program. After taking 
office in 2017, the Trump administration maneuvered itself into a corner 
regarding North Korea’s nuclear program. Like the Obama and Bush 
administrations, it was unwilling to acknowledge the failure of nuclear 
nonproliferation vis- à- vis the DPRK and accept the political and strategic 
problems of living with a nuclear North Korea.46 At the same time, how-
ever, it was equally reluctant to pay the costs associated with a military 
campaign against the North Korean nuclear program. Thus, North Korea’s 
pledge at Singapore to “denuclearize” and—more substantively—its on-
going de facto moratorium on nuclear tests create a useful fiction for the 
United States.47 As other analysts suggest, these steps give US leaders a fig 
leaf to cover their nonproliferation failure, allowing the United States to 
still declare counterproliferation a success and helping to ratchet down the 
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threat of war.48 After all, this fiction allowed Trump to declare that North 
Korea was “no longer a nuclear threat” immediately after Singapore and 
his administration to sustain this narrative, even as evidence emerged that 
North Korea is hiding nuclear assets and continuing work on its nuclear 
delivery options.49 More broadly, the North Korean fiction provides a po-
litical tool to help the United States resist other states’ proliferation efforts 
while justifying whatever steps are necessary to make deterring a nuclear 
North Korea viable. Baldly stated, if North Korea is to eventually denucle-
arize, then deterring a nuclear DPRK is just a temporary expedient—not 
a permanent US mission.50
Third, there appears to be a nascent framework in which diplomatic 
dialogue and engagement—helping to regularize North Korea’s role in 
the region—is occurring. Progress has been intermittent and limited. 
However, the United States has named a special representative to oversee 
the negotiations, ministerial- and working- level talks have taken place 
(and may continue in the future), and Trump himself is taking an increas-
ingly direct role in efforts designed to facilitate the process.51 No one 
knows whether these discussions will result in substantive gains. Initial 
talks ended with North Korea decrying the United States’ attitude toward 
negotiation, impeding US diplomatic efforts to discuss North Korean 
nuclear issues, and making largely symbolic concessions to the United 
States (for instance, offering some verification at the Punggye- ri nuclear 
testing site) that—as Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda observe—have little 
“particular bearing on the ‘mass production’ of  ballistic missiles and nuclear 
weapons.”52 Still, the existence of a bilateral US- DPRK diplomatic pro-
cess reduces the chance of miscalculation and future crises.53 As important 
is the presence of a diplomatic framework requiring the United States and 
North Korea to have a functional, more normal diplomatic relationship—
one in which policy makers can exchange views and information through 
known channels rather than eschewing most contact as had been custom-
ary.54 The net result is that North Korea’s pariah status is increasingly a 
thing of the past.55
The United States is not alone in this task: Japan and South Korea 
(both American allies) are also crafting a diplomatic process. Through 
mid-2018, both American allies were unhappy with the prospect of living 
with a nuclear DPRK, yet just as fearful that the United States would end 
up entrapping them into a war.56 The latter concern now appears much 
reduced. Thus, even while trying to sustain their alliances with the United 
States, both actors have begun talking in detail with North Korea. In an 
echo of West Germany’s Ostpolitik outreach to East Germany, South 
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Korea’s Nordpolitik apparently encompasses efforts to engage both North 
Korea and the United States to shape the terms of any denuclearization 
package.57 Building on prior outreach, South Korea has also engaged 
North Korea in talks aimed at diminishing the DPRK’s conventional 
threat while reinvigorating economic and social connections with North 
Korea; as of this writing (March 2019), reports further indicate that South 
Korea is seeking to facilitate future negotiations between the United 
States and North Korea.58 Japanese policy makers, meanwhile, have met 
with North Korean officials to discuss bilateral relations, just as a summit 
between Kim and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe remains a possi-
bility.59 Of course, the risk remains that a widening gulf may open between 
South Korea, the United States, and/or Japan on North Korean issues and 
undercut the United States’ partnership with one or both countries (par-
ticularly should tensions with North Korea spike).60 Still, South Korean 
and Japanese leaders have signaled that they see their alliances with the 
United States as central to addressing North Korean issues, and—since 
states tend to balance proximate military threats—the trend seems to be 
toward engaging North Korea without sacrificing ties with the United 
States.61 In effect, Northeast Asia may be witnessing the emergence of a 
less conflictual and more fluid regional security environment.
Finally, China now has a green light to continue as the prime backer 
and influencer of North Korea. Before mid-2018, China was understand-
ably worried that bilateral US- North Korean talks might result in a deal 
that pulled North Korea out of China’s orbit.62 Since that time, however, 
the opposite has occurred. Less than a week after Singapore, North Korean 
leaders hastened to brief the Chinese leadership on the course of the dis-
cussions and confer on a negotiating strategy. Similarly, Kim and other 
North Korean officials met with their Chinese interlocutors to discuss 
strategy in advance of the Hanoi meeting.63 As importantly, US officials 
including Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and then- Secretary of De-
fense James Mattis separately visited Beijing in the second half of 2018 to 
sustain Chinese support for the North Korean denuclearization drive and 
later praised Beijing’s moves; much of this effort involved encouraging 
Chinese efforts to keep economic sanctions on North Korea.64 Consider-
ing that China is North Korea’s primary economic partner, these discus-
sions have only reinforced China’s hand: if sanctions are to continue and/
or have any bite, China will need to have its interests met.65
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The Prospective Settlement in Northeast Asia
Individually, no one of these developments would change the security 
situation in Northeast Asia. Taken together, however, they hold potential 
for a substantial adjustment of Northeast Asian insecurities—helping 
reconcile the interests of states in the area such that competition and co-
operation can occur within defined boundaries. Much depends on whether 
the United States and North Korea continue the guarantees- for- 
denuclearization fiction while vested regional actors sustain the diplomatic 
momentum seen to date. None of these outcomes are yet assured, all the 
more so as the Hanoi Summit and its aftermath prompted questions over 
the American and North Korean willingness to accommodate the other 
sides’ demands.66 Assuming they come to fruition, however, it is possible 
to envision the outlines of a new Northeast Asian equilibrium.
At the heart of this potential settlement is North Korea’s removal as a 
regional flashpoint.67 Here, the fiction of a denuclearizing North Korea 
affords the United States and North Korea room to ratchet down tensions. 
Even if a regular diplomatic relationship never emerges, the resulting struc-
ture for discussions will help avoid miscalculations and give both parties a 
stake in the prevailing strategic situation—potentially helping to keep 
crises to a minimum. Concurrently, with regime change off the table due 
to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the United States can set to work fostering 
a viable deterrence regime by focusing additional resources on ascertain-
ing the scope of the DPRK nuclear arsenal and determining how best to 
keep North Korea from crossing American red lines.68
South Korea and Japan could also fulfill their security needs within this 
emerging framework. With overt North Korean nuclear swaggering on 
the decline, pressure for South Korea and Japan to respond in similarly 
assertive fashion—including debates over acquiring their own nuclear 
weapons—are poised to wane.69 Given the aforementioned South Korean 
and Japanese outreach to North Korea amid efforts to sustain US–South 
Korean and US- Japanese relations, this solution could involve a combina-
tion of sticks and carrots encouraging all parties to avoid provocative actions 
while hedging against DPRK backsliding.
China may gain as well.70 With the threat of a US- led military campaign 
against North Korea substantially reduced, China now has comparative 
stability on its northeastern flank. Furthermore, the better North Korean 
relations with the United States and US partners become, the lower the 
potential for North Korea to trigger a crisis that ensnares China and the 
greater China’s ability to set the pace and tone of diplomatic develop-
ments in Northeast Asia. As such, China can focus on ensuring that North 
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Korea does not collapse due to internal pressures; much like the Soviet 
Union with East Germany during the Cold War, China’s role becomes 
sustaining its client’s survival from within rather than beating back threats 
from without. In sum, the emerging settlement embraces the existing terri-
torial and security division in Northeast Asia while implicitly recognizing a 
Chinese sphere of influence, thus giving China incentives to manage its 
area judiciously.71 Even if China seeks to change Asia’s security and eco-
nomic order writ large, the approach described above creates room for 
competition to remain comparatively peaceful and regulated.
Finally, it is plausible to expect North Korea to embrace the nascent 
settlement. With its nuclear arsenal intact for the indefinite future, security 
guarantees from the United States, and ongoing diplomatic engagement 
from South Korea and Japan, North Korea’s strategic position is the best 
it has been in some time.72 The DPRK may also gain more in the future if 
diplomatic negotiations with the United States and other vested parties 
result in sanctions relief and growing economic opportunities.73 The cost 
of these gains is its formal commitment to denuclearization—including a 
potential roadmap to this end,74 tacit agreement not to overtly flaunt its 
nuclear weapons capability,75 and greater subservience to Chinese influ-
ence.76 In effect, North Korea would gain substantial independence from 
external challenges in exchange for embracing its client state status.
Critics might argue that the United States has been here before. After 
all, this is not the first time the United States, the DPRK, and other actors 
have negotiated over the DPRK nuclear program. Furthermore, many of 
the prior offers—for instance, the 1990s- era quid pro quo of international 
economic assistance in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear efforts—
echo elements of deals under discussion today.77 One might therefore 
wonder whether and why a potential settlement is possible today when 
previous bargains fell by the wayside.78
These parallels are deceiving. The current situation in Northeast Asia is 
different than in times past owing to the fundamental change in the distri-
bution of power wrought by the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In 
fact, the source of the potential settlement described here is the very thing 
that seems to make the arrangement implausible: North Korea’s ability to 
target the United States and American allies with nuclear weapons and 
the United States’ comparative inability to deprive the DPRK of its 
nuclear option.79 Put differently, a Northeast Asian settlement might have 
appeared attainable in the past. Still, the inability of the United States to 
either guarantee North Korea’s existence or accept a nuclear North Korea, 
the threat this ambiguity posed to North Korea and China, and North 
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Korea’s inclination to needle the United States and its allies made a deal 
near impossible. However, with North Korea’s existence virtually ensured 
by its nuclear arsenal and—potentially—American guarantees, the distri-
bution of power and interests in Northeast Asia is much clarified.80 The 
United States has effectively reached the extent of its power and influence 
in the region. North Korea has found a way to ensure its survival but can 
most benefit from this situation only by working with long- standing allies 
and adversaries. China need no longer fear entrapment or the loss of its 
ally, but it must find new ways of managing its client. Like the US- Soviet 
settlement after the mid-1960s, the prospective security structure in 
Northeast Asia—inadvertent and unexpected though it might be—may 
be the least of several evils for the actors involved as each needs to adapt 
to the new strategic environment. Incentives for the actors involved to 
negotiate and operate within limits have increased commensurately.81
Steps and Missteps: Getting to a Settlement
Again, there is no guarantee this settlement will come to fruition or 
prove sustainable. On one level, given the Trump administration’s ad hoc 
approach to foreign policy and internal fissures, it is unclear whether the 
United States will remain interested in the Singapore deal or judge North 
Korea a viable partner. Particularly as evidence mounts that North Korea 
may not be moving toward denuclearization, the current US administration—
which has previously delayed and threatened to cancel negotiations in response 
to DPRK intransigence—may decide to change course.82 Similar prob-
lems involve North Korea, which has a track record of backtracking on 
agreements no longer seen to suit its interests and a tendency of lashing 
out if it feels threatened.83
Obtaining a settlement may also be difficult due to ongoing tensions in 
the US- South Korea and US- Japan alliances. Since 2017, US relations 
with its allies have degraded owing to disputes over the cost of stationed 
US forces, criticism of allied economic behavior, and suggestions that the 
United States might more generally reduce ties with long- standing partners. 
In response, South Korea and Japan have reportedly moved to debate ways 
of providing greater security for themselves and, in particular, considered 
acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.84 Should the latter come to pass 
in unregulated fashion, it risks antagonizing North Korea and China by 
rendering US- backed security guarantees moot and setting the stage for 
regional insecurity spirals that would make any settlement immaterial.85 
Ultimately, securing a settlement requires carefully adjudicating the role 
and capability of current US alliances in any arrangement. Whether the 
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Trump administration is able or willing to engage its partners to obtain a 
settlement—let alone whether South Korea and Japan will trust the 
United States’ initiatives—remains unclear.86
Moreover, even if a settlement comes into being, sustaining it may not 
be a straightforward task. The Cold War experience is instructive. After 
the mid-1960s, American and Soviet policy makers were vexed with 
domestic and international pressures to ignore their tacit settlement. This 
situation compelled them to actively manage domestic and international 
audiences to forestall a return to early Cold War tensions (an effort that 
was only somewhat successful).87 Similar dynamics are possible in Northeast 
Asia. On the American side, sustaining a settlement will require reining in 
foreign policy hawks reluctant to allow the DPRK to de facto retain a 
nuclear arsenal (or seek regime change for other reasons).88 The United 
States will also need to find a way of engaging allies fearful of conflict with 
North Korea yet also averse to letting a neighboring state enjoy a local 
nuclear advantage.
North Korea has problems, too. Kim’s rule appears intact, but changes 
in the DPRK leadership and/or internal unrest could imperil the arrange-
ment. Likewise, North Korea’s leaders may be disinclined to accept living 
with the status quo or to permit China to dominate North Korean inter-
national fortunes.89 The DPRK may also try to use its nuclear assets to 
extract additional concessions, leaving the United States in the fraught 
position of either conceding to North Korean demands or risking the failure 
of a framework in which it has invested much of its own time and energy.90 
China, meanwhile, will need to corral a nuclear- armed client. None of 
these tasks are simple. Even if a settlement emerges, it may be fragile and 
fraught with risks.
Despite these uncertainties, securing a settlement in Northeast Asia 
may be a productive way of reducing one of the most troublesome spots in 
US foreign relations. To boost the chances of success, the United States 
should proceed along several tracks. First, the United States and its 
partners need to continue outreach to North Korea. Rather than immediate 
denuclearization, the objective should be establishing a process that links 
sanctions relief and security guarantees for North Korea to a plan delineat-
ing particular North Korean actions and policies that reinforce the claim 
of North Korea’s eventual denuclearization.91 Denuclearization is unlikely 
to occur, but creating a framework will give policy makers in the United 
States, North Korea, and other states political maneuvering room while 
dampening North Korean insecurities. At the same time, affording North 
Korea something of value gives it a stake in the status quo and provides 
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the United States leverage if North Korea tries extorting further conces-
sions (for instance, by threatening the resumption of nuclear tests). Plainly 
stated, this effort raises the costs of North Korea challenging the settlement.
Second, the United States should quietly make clear to China what the 
United States expects from the future China- DPRK relationship and 
consider what China seeks from the United States in kind. In other words, 
diplomatic discussions between China and the United States will be 
needed to deconflict expectations while arriving at a common understand-
ing of what the Northeast Asian settlement does and does not entail.92 
These discussions cannot cover every twist and turn of Northeast Asian 
relations. Likewise, policy makers will need to find some way of isolating 
discussions on North Korea from more conflictual elements of the US- China 
relationship, including economic tensions and disputes in the South and 
East China Seas.93 Still, as a way of creating a common reference point, 
engagement with China can mitigate the risk that unexpected events or 
developments in other portions of US- China relations will negatively 
affect Northeast Asian security.94
Third, and relatedly, the United States should begin working with China 
to facilitate Chinese leverage over North Korea. This will be no easy task. 
During the Cold War, the United States’ ability to influence European allies 
with nuclear arsenals (e.g., France and Britain) was considerably more lim-
ited compared to those lacking them (e.g., West Germany). In fact, owing 
to their comparatively greater security, nuclear- armed clients were occasion-
ally able to exert a significant degree of independence—as, for instance, 
Britain showcased during the Suez crisis.95 With North Korea likely retain-
ing a nuclear arsenal, China’s ability to shape North Korean fortunes will be 
similarly constrained. To maximize Chinese influence, the United States 
should therefore encourage China to reinforce its economic and security ties 
with North Korea. Ideally, the growth of bilateral China–North Korean ties 
will discourage North Korea from brandishing its nuclear sword at the first 
sign of future trouble by providing the Chinese government with tools to 
influence and restrain Pyongyang’s decision making.96
Fourth, American policy makers need to find a way of balancing allied 
efforts to engage North Korea with (1) reciprocal allied interest in sustain-
ing security ties with the United States and (2) the risk that too little 
intra- alliance coordination could prompt US allies to hedge against the 
DPRK in ways that disrupt ongoing diplomatic bargaining. That is, a 
pathway is needed to simultaneously reassure and engage US allies as a 
settlement comes to fruition while giving them enough independent 
leeway to engage North Korea as they see fit. To this end, the United 
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States should consider stepping up ongoing consultations with its partners 
before and after talks with the DPRK.97 A multilateral approach is un-
necessary; in fact, it may be counterproductive by limiting North Korea’s 
ability to envision a beneficial shift in the regional diplomatic environment 
from a settlement. However, US policy makers should work with American 
allies to discuss the broad parameters of what an ideal settlement would 
entail. Along the way, it might also be advantageous for the United States 
to sequence its intra- alliance ambitions so efforts to adjust the alliances’ 
security and economic provisions (e.g., reducing US security commit-
ments and allied economic offsets for the US military presence) occur after 
negotiations with the DPRK mature. These steps would not only help 
address allied insecurities in the near term, but they allow any future 
adjustments to account for North Korea’s evolving role in Northeast Asia.
Finally, the Trump administration will need to reorient the US policy- 
making establishment toward the steps needed to structure and sustain a 
settlement. This does not mean simply engaging and rewarding DPRK 
behavior. Rather, and much like the US- Soviet relationship from the 
mid-1960s onward, resources must be devoted to acquiring the intelli-
gence and military tools needed for a stable deterrence relationship with 
the DPRK.98 At the same time, US leaders should facilitate a domestic 
political consensus in favor of the emerging settlement. This may be an 
especially challenging endeavor. At root, the initial decision to meet with 
the North Korean leader was a stark departure from normal policy making. 
Now, US diplomacy in Northeast Asia is taking on an increasingly partisan 
cast as many Democrats and Republicans question the president’s 
approach.99 To avoid having future US policy makers back away from any 
settlement and to put US policy on a sound long- term footing, the Trump 
administration will need to earn the support of key decision makers and 
stakeholders across the policy- making and procedural spectrum.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the United States has failed in its stated goal of denuclearizing 
North Korea. This situation is unlikely to change in the future. Nonetheless, 
this outcome should not blind us to the broader strategic consequences of 
US diplomacy. On the horizon is a potential pathway for a Northeast 
Asian settlement where the Koreas, the United States, China, and Japan 
can each live within the status quo. There is no guarantee that the potential 
described in this article will be reached. Furthermore, even if a settlement 
takes shape, it will take real efforts by policy makers over the long term to 
see the arrangement sustained. Still, durable settlements in international 
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politics are not always immediately apparent; sometimes they develop infor-
mally if not tacitly and emerge only after periods of tension, posturing, and 
disappointment. Just as the early Cold War unexpectedly fostered a secu-
rity system in which the United States, European actors, and the Soviet 
Union could survive and bargain, so too may an analogous arrangement be 
possible in Northeast Asia. The United States has thus far failed to denuclear-
ize North Korea, but this failure may be an inadvertent success. 
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